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FOR EWORD
This is one of a set of seven reports, each one describing the
results, for a particular subsystem, of a study titled "An Engineering
Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques." Under the general title of
"A Guide to Onboard Checkout, " the reports are as follows.
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Section 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 OBJECTIVE
With the advent of large scale aerospace systems, designers have recognized
the importance of specifying and meeting design requirements additional to the
classical functional and environmental requirements. These "additional" require-
ments include producibility, safety, reliability, quality, and maintainability.
These criteria have been identified, grown into prominence, and become disciplines
in their own right. Presently, it is inconceivable that any aerospace system/
equipment design requirements would be formulated without consideration of
these criteria.
The complexity, sophistication and duration of future manned space missions
demand that still another criterion needs to be considered in the formulation of
system/equipment requirements. The concept of "checkoutability" denotes the
adaptability of a system, subsystem, or equipment to a controlled checkout pro-
cess. As with other requirements, it should also apply from the time of early
design concept formulation.
The results of "An Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques" and
other studies indicate that for an extended space mission onboard checkout is
mandatory and applicable to all subsystems of the space system. In order to use
it effectively, "checkoutability" should be incorporated into the design of each
subsystem, beginning with initial performance requirements.
Conferences with researchers, system engineers and subsystem specialists
in the course of the basic Onboard Checkout Techniques Study revealed an extensive
interest in the idea of autonomous onboard checkout. Designers are motivated to
incorporate "checkoutability" into their subsystem designs but express a need for
information and guidance that will enable them to do so efficiently.
It is the objective of this report to present the results of the basic study as
they relate to one space subsystem to serve as a guide, by example, to those who
in the future need to implement onboard checkout in a similar subsystem. It is not
practicable to formulate a firm set of instructions or recipes, because operational
requirements, which vary widely among systems, normally determine the check-
out philosophy. It is suggested that the reader study this report as a basis from
which to build his own approach to "checkoutability. "
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1.2 BASIC STUDY SUMMARY
1.2.1 STUDY OBJECTIVE
The basic study was aimed at identification and evaluation of techniques for
achieving the following capabilities in the operational Space Station/Base, under
control of the Data Management System (DMS), with minimal crew intervention.
* Automated failure prediction and detection
· Automated fault isolation
* Failure correction
· Onboard electronic maintenance
1.2.2 STUDY BASELINE
The study started in July 1970. The system design baseline was established
by the Space Station Phase B study results as achieved by the McDonnell-Douglas/
IBM team, modified in accordance with technical direction from NASA-MSC. The
overall system configuration was the 33-foot diameter, four-deck, 12-man station.
Individual subsystem baseline descriptions are given in their respective "Guide to
Onboard Checkout" reports.
1. 2.3 STUDY TASKS
The basic study comprised five tasks. Primary emphasis was given to
Task 1, Requirements Analysis and Concepts. This task established subsystem
baseline descriptions and then analyzed them to determine their reliability/main-
tainability characteristics (criticality, failure modes and effects, maintenance
concepts and line replaceable unit (LRU) definitions), checkout strategies, test
definitions, and definitions of stimuli and measurements. After software pre-
liminary designs were available, an analysis of checkout requirements on the DMS
was performed.
A software task was performed to determine the software requirements
dictated by the results of Task 1.
Task 3 was a study of onboard electronic maintenance requirements and
recommendations of concepts to satisfy them. Supporting research and technology
tasks leading to an onboard maintenance capability were identified. The study
implementation plan and recommendations for implementing results of the study
were developed in Task 4. The task final report also summarizes results of the
study in all technical tasks.
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Reliability, Task 5, was very limited in scope, resulting in an analysis of
failure modes and effects in three Space Station subsystems, GN&C, DMS (computer
group) and RF communications.
1.2.4 PREVIOUS REPORTS
Results of the basic study were reported by task in the following reports,
under the general title of "An Engineering Study of Onboard Checkout Techniques,
Final Report. "
IBM Number Title
71W-00111
71W-00112
71W-00113
71W-00114
71W-00115
Task 1: Requirements Analysis and Concepts
Task 2: Software
Task 3: Onboard Maintenance
Task 4: Summary and Recommendations
Task 5: Subsystem Level Failure Modes and
Effects
1-3/1-4
Section 2
BASELINE SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS
2.1 GENERAL
This section describes the baseline Propulsion Subsystem which was
analyzed to define onboard checkout requirements. In order to assess require-
ments for onboard checkout, descriptions at the subsystem level and the assembly
level are required, as well as the major interfaces between subsystems.
The assembly level description for each of the subsystems (MSFC-DRL-160,
Line Item 13) provided the primary working document for subsystem analysis. To
reduce documentation, these documents have been incorporated by reference into
this report, where applicable. Therefore, where no significant differences exist
from the Phase B definition, this report contains a brief subsystem description
and an identification of the referenced document containing the assembly level
descriptions for that subsystem. Where significant differences do exist, the sub-
system level description includes these changes in as much detail as is available.
MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 19, provided the major subsystem interface descrip-
tions for analysis of integrated test requirements.
2.2 SUBSYSTEM LEVEL DESCRIPTION
The Space Station Propulsion System is required to perform the following
functions:
* Provide attitude control, maneuvers, and docking functions prior
to initial operations
* Perform spin/despin maneuvers for the artificial-g experiments
* Provide attitude control (wobble damp) during artificial-g
experiment periods
* Perform orbit-keeping
* Provide control during docking maneuvers
* Provide backup attitude control
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To accomplish these functions, a two-system propulsion subsystem was
selected. A low-thrust, resistojet thrustor system using biowaste gases
(CH4 , CO2 as propellant will perform orbit-keeping and can, if desired, de-
saturate the CMGs. All other functions will be performed by a high-thrust,
monopropellant hydrazine (N2 H4 ) system.
The use of a biowaste resistojet system for orbit-keeping minimizes re-
supply, provides a useful method of biowaste disposal, minimizes contamination,
and produces a near zero-g acceleration. A hydrazine high-thrust system for
high torque, high impulse functions minimizes contamination and maximizes
ease of maintenance.
The large quantities of propellant required for spin/despin maneuvers
(6250 pounds per maneuver) prohibits initial loading, which necessitates resupply
capability to be included in the design. This resupply can best be accomplished
by bulk fluid transfer from the Advanced Logistic System (ALS) cargo module.
The Low-Thrust Propulsion System consists of five major assemblies:
* Collection and Storage Assembly
* Water Supplement Assembly
* Propellant Flow Control and Selection Assembly
· Thruster Assembly
* Power Distribution and Control Assembly
The High-Thrust Hydrazine Subsystem consists of seven major assemblies
or assembly groups:
* High Presssure Storage Assemblies
* Pressure Control Assembly
* Propellant Tankage Assemblies
* Thruster Modules
* Resupply Assemblies
e Purge/Cleaning Assembly
* Propulsion Fault Isolation and Detection Assemblies
2-2
2.3 ASSEMBLY LEVEL DESCRIPTION
Descriptions of the Propulsion Subsystem assemblies and assembly groups
are provided in the Space Station MSFC-DRL-160, Line Item 13, Volume I, Book
4, Utility Services. These descriptions include discussions of the major assem-
blies and assembly groups, block diagrams and drawings, and interfaces. DRL
13, Volume I, Book 2, is incorporated by reference into this report as a detailed
description of the Propulsion Subsystem major assemblies and will become the
primary working document for further analysis.
2-3/2-4
Section 3
RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY ANALYSES
3.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
As a guide to emphasis in subsequent checkout technique studies, an analysis
has been made of the overall subsystem and major component criticality (failure
probability) of the Space Station subsystems and equipment. As an input to the
Checkout Requirements Analysis Task, this data along with the failure mode and
effects data will be useful in determining test priorities and test scheduling.
Additionally, this data will aid in optimizing checkout system design to ensure
that confidence of failure detection is increased in proportion to added system
complexity and cost.
3.1.1 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS PROCEDURE
A criticality number (related to failure probability) was generated for each
major subsystem component. This number is the product of: (1) the component
failure rate (or the reciprocal of mean-time-between-failure), (2) the component's
anticipated usage or duty cycle, and (3) an orbital time period of six months, or
4, 380 hours. Six months was chosen as the time period of interest to allow one
missed resupply on the basis of normal resupply occurring at three-month intervals.
The criticality number, then, is the failure expectation for a particular component
over any six-month time period.
For visibility, the major components of each subsystem analyzed have been
ordered according to the magnitude of their criticality numbers. This number,
however, should not be considered as an indication of the-real risk involved, since
it does not take into account such factors as redundant components, subsystem
maintainability, and the alternate operational procedures available.
Overall subsystem criticality has been determined by a computerized
optimization process whereby spares and redundancy are considered in terms of
a trade-off between increased reliability and weight. This determination, there-
fore, reflects not only the failure probability of subsystem components, but also
the probability that a spare or redundant component may not be available to
restore the subsystem to operational status. The methodology used is described
in Section 9, Long-Life Assurance Study Results, DRL 13 (Preliminary Subsystem
Design Data), Volume III (Supporting Analyses), Book 4 (Safety/Long Life/Test
Philosophy) from the MDAC Phase B Space Station Study. Component-level failure
mode and criticality data are presented in subsequent paragraphs.
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3.1.2 SUBSYSTEM CRITICALITY DATA
The Propulsion Subsystem six-month reliability prediction with 600 pounds
of spares is 0. 992. The two independent low thrust systems with inherent replace-
ment capability of many critical components provide a high degree of assurance
that orbit-keeping functions will be sustained for a ten-year period. No single or
credible combination of failures can cause loss of the Propulsion System.
The criticality ranking of Table 3-1 indicates that the two-stage CO2 and
CH4 pumps are the most critical. An additional spare unit may qualify here and
greatly reduce the overall risk of failure.
3.2 FAILURE EFFECTS ANALYSIS
Based upon the baseline subsystem descriptions, each major subsystem
component was assessed to determine its most probable failure mode(s), and
the "mission effect" associated with this failure mode(s). The "mission effect"
is noted to provide a brief explanation of Space Station behavior if the particular
failure mode should occur (e. g., experiments degraded, crew hazard, etc. ).
The explanation generally does not, however, consider the offsetting effects of
backup redundancy or spares since there would be practically no effect if these
factors were considered.
In addition, the effect of failure is categorized into the following criticality
classes:
(a) Category I - Failure could cause a loss of life.
(b) Category II - Failure could cause the loss of a primary mission
objective.
(c) Category III - Failure could cause the loss of a secondary mission
objective.
(d) Category IV - Failure results in only a nuisance.
In most cases, Category II and Category III failures are not distinguishable
because primary and secondary mission objectives have not been identified to the
level of detail required to permit such separation.
Examples of component level failure mode and criticality classification
data are shown in Table 3-2, which is a partial listing.
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Table 3-1. Propulsion Subsystem Criticality Ranking
Single Unit Conditioned
Component Criticality Loss Criticality
(10-6) (10-6)
Pump and Motor 166, 000 9, 500
Power Control
Assembly
GN 2 Purge Tanks
Propellant Tank
Assembly
Thruster Modules
Regulators
Pressure Regulator
(GN2)
Relief Valves
Burst and Relief Valve
43, 800
42,000
42,000
13, 700
12, 300
12, 300
8,900
8,900
20
180
2,000
75
144
144
16
56
Remarks
This numeric applies to both CO2 and CH4 pumps.
Considers backup 2-stage pumps as nonoperating
until required
Internal redundancy plus backup
Backup N2 aboard S/S
Operation allowed with 11 of 14 tanks
Considers backup for despin and docking
disturbance
Applies to CO2 and CH4 regulators w/backup
Backup failure considered
Considers risk of GN2 tank overpressurization
Considers risk of propellant tank overpressuri-
zation
Table 3-1. Propulsion Subsystem Criticality Ranking (Continue
Single Unit Conditioned
Component Criticality Loss Criticality
(10-6) (10-6)
H20 Tank 5,900 <10
Accumulator (CH4 )
Accumulator (CO2 )
Valve Solenoid CO2
Line to Accumulator
Valve Solenoid CH4
Line to Accumulator
Regulation Valves
Cross Feed Valves
Isolation Valves
Isolation Valves
Valve, Solenoid (H2 O
Tank to Vaporizer)
5,900
5,900
3, 160
3,160
3,160
3,160
3, 160
3, 160
2, 960
<10
<10
1
1
<10
<10
<10
<10
<10
ed)
Remarks
Backup tank plus alternate source of CH4 and CO2
available
Backup accumulator plus CH4 can be obtained
directly from EC/LS
Backup accumulator plus CO2 can be obtained
from EC/LS
Backup plus EC/LS furnished CO2 available
Backup plus EC/LS furnished CH4 available
Backup exists
Backup exists
Backup failure considered
Backup failure considered
Backup failure considered
Table 3-1. Propulsion Subsystem Criticality Ranking (Continued)
Single Unit Conditioned
Component Criticality Loss Criticality
(10-6) (10-6)
Water Vaporizer 1,120 <10 Ba
Manifold 1,120 <10 Ba
Thruster Assembly 700 <10 Ba
Tank, Storage GN2 440 <10 Ba
(3000 psia)
Pressure Switch
Hi/Low
Burst Disk
Water Tank Heater
Filter
Filter
Fluid Resupply
Connectors
220
150
88
44
44
Neg'l
<10
<10
(10
<10
<10
Ba
Ba
Ba
Ba
Ba
Remarks
ickup failure considered
ackup failure considered
ackup failure considered
Lckup failure considered
ickup failure considered
Lckup failure considered
ackup failure considered
Lckup failure considered
ackup failure considered
I
cn
Table 3-2. Propulsion Subsystem
(A) (B) Criticality
Major Failure Mission Failure No. of MTBF/Source Duty Unit
Subsystem Mode(s) Effect Category Units Thousands Cycle (4380 hrs X
Component of Hours (%) B/A X 10-6)
Low Thrust
1) Accumulator
(CH4 )
Leakage, rupture 1/(1)Performance de-
graded, partial loss
of orbit-keeping
capability; loss of
flexibility to choose
accumulators
2) Accumulator
(C02)
Leakage
Rupture
Performance de-
graded; partial loss
of orbit-keeping
capability; loss of
CMG desaturation
capability
II/III 1/(1)
3) Pump & Motor
4) Filter
Motor shorted;
no output
cavitation pump
bearing binds
(Saturated) open
Performance de-
graded CO2 & CH4
not compressed
Performance de-
graded; impurities
not filtered from
CH4 line or C02 line
(as applicable) caus-
ing contamination
downstream
II/III 2/2
(C02)
2/(2)
(CH4 )
II/III 1/(1)
(CO2)
1/(1)
(CH4 )
26. 4/(12)
100, 000/(12)
745/(12) 100 5, 900
745/(12) 100 5, 900
100
100
166,000
44
II/III
3.3 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT ANALYSIS
Maintenance concepts defined for Space Station subsystems are intended to
facilitate their preservation or restoration to an operational state with a minimum
of time, skill, and resources within the planned environment. Maintenance
concepts, in general, are discussed in Section 7.
The Propulsion Subsystem design incorporates specific maintenance or
related provisions to satisfy the provisions of the general Space Station main-
tenance policy. The subsystem is designed for shirtsleeve maintenance, when-
ever possible, and no EVA shall be required.
Maintenance removal and replacement are by components and/or assemblies;
i. e., no component adjustment and/or disassembly of components are necessary.
No scheduled maintenance (remove and replace) is planned with the exception
of filters. Critical failure modes have safeguards (backup/redundancy or auto-
matic fault isolation) designed into the subsystem.
The need for removal and replacement is determined by evaluation of:
* Leak and functional checks
· Actual life history of component and/or assemblies
* Performance checks
* Past development results/history
Safety provisions and/or procedures for normal crew maintenance opera-
tions are provided; for example,
* Propulsion subsystem assemblies are housed/installed in un-
pressurized (pressurizable) compartments.
* Propellant leak detection capability is provided in the compartments.
* Decontamination/cleaning methods/procedures for "breaking" into the
subsystem (i.e., propellant removal from lines, components, filters,
tanks, etc. ) shall be established.
Reliability shall not degrade below the design reliability established. The
design reliability is provided by:
* Maintenance/replacement of components and assemblies to meet
design reliability requirements over a ten-year period.
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* Safety factors/working stress levels that satisfy ten years of
operation/fatigue, creep, corrosion, etc., wherever practical.
* More redundancy and/or automatic fault isolation for critical malfunc-
tion which affect safety of operations. The safety design feature must
allow a mission operation to be completed (degraded performance al-
lowed). This also allows maintenance to be scheduled whenever it is
required.
The subsystem maintenance and operational approaches listed above will
normally provide an autonomous Propulsion Subsystem with the reliability and
safety needed for a ten-year mission. These features allow a balanced subsystem
design approach to be taken to obtain the high reliability and safety needed without
excessive redundancy/backup and the resulting complexity, volume, and weight
penalties.
3.4 LINE REPLACEABLE UNIT ANALYSIS
General guidelines and criteria for the definition of LRUs were established
and these along with the maintenance philosophies reported in Section 3. 3 were
used to determine at what level line maintenance would be performed. For the
Space Station Subsystems specific justification applicable to LRU selection for the
particular subsystem under examination was derived from the guidelines and these
justifications are presented along with the LRU listing. The "functional LRUs"
were then considered in the light of the standard electronic packaging scheme and
actual LRUs were defined and listed. The method employed and the results
achieved are discussed for both cases in the following sections.
3.4. 1 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS
The definition of Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) is keyed to repairing sub-
systems in an in-place configuration with the LRU being the smallest modular unit
suitable for replacement. General factors considered in identifying subsystem
LRUs include: (1) maintenance concepts; (2) the component-level failure rates
delineated in the criticality analyses; (3) the amount of crew time and skill re-
quired for fault isolation and repair; (4) resultant DMS hardware and software
complexity; and (5) subsystem weight, volume, location, and interchangeability
characteristics. Listings of LRUs and more specific justification for their
selection follows.
Line replaceable units for the low thrust portion of the Propulsion Subsystem
are listed in Table 3-3. High Thrust Propulsion Subsystem LRUs are listed in
Table 3-4. Although considerable operational redundancy exists within the sub-
system, the only elements that can be categorized as "standby redundant" are the
low-thrust flow control assembly and the high-thrust pressure control assembly.
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Table 3-3. Low-Thrust Propulsion
LRU Quantity
Collection/Storage Assembly
Compression Pump 4
Propellant Storage Bottle 4
Filter 4
Relief Assembly 4
Tank Isolation Valve 4
Control Valve Assembly 2
Low Pressure Mixing Valve 2
High Pressure Mixing Valve 2
Water Supplement Assembly
Storage Bottle 2
Water Vaporizer 2
Thermal Control Assembly 2
Fill/Drain Valve 1
Tank Isolation Valve 2
Flow Control Valve 2
Pressure Control Valve Assembly 2
Flow Control Assembly
Regulator Assembly 2
Regulator Isolation Valve Assembly 2
Cross-feed Valve Assembly 1
Thruster Assembly
Module Isolation Valve 8
Thruster Assembly 8
Power Distribution and Control Assembly 1
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Table 3-4. Hi-Thrust Propulsion
LRU Quantity
Press Storage Assembly (3000 psia GN2 )
Storage Sphere 2
Relief Valve 2
Burst Disk 2
Isolation Valve 2
Pressure Transducer 2
Temperature Transducer 2
Hi-Press Manifold
Isolation Valve 3
Vent Valve 2
Pressure Transducer 2
Filter Assembly 2
Disconnect Assembly 1
Press Control Assembly
Regulator 2
Isolation Valve 2
Press Switch (hi/lo) 4
Filter 2
Lo-Press Manifold
Isolation Valve 2
Press Transducer 2
Vent Valve 1
Disconnect Assembly 1
Propellant Storage Assembly
Prop Tanks (Metal Bellows) 2
Relief Valve 2
Burst Disk 2
Isolation Valves (Prop and Ullage) 4
Press Transducer 4
Temperature Transducer 4
Qty Gauging (Assembly/System) 2
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Table 3-4. Hi-Thrust Propulsion (Continued)
LRU Quantity
Propellant Manifold
Isolation Valve 6
Fill Valve 1
Vent Valve 1
Purge Valve 1
Press Transducer 3
Filter Assembly 1
Prop Dump Assembly (Nonpropulsive 1
Prop Decomposition)
Disconnect Assembly 1
Thruster Modules
Thruster Assembly 12
Isolation Valve 10
Filter Assembly 4
Press Transducer (liquid) 10
Press Transducer (Comb Chamber) 12
Temperature Transducer (Comb Chamber) 12
Purge Assembly
Press Sphere 2
Regulator 1
Isolated Valves 8
Press Transducers 4
Resupply Assembly (Station)
Isolation Valve (Press and Props) 4
Umbilical Hoses 4
Disconnect Assembly 4
Filters 4
Miscellaneous Assembly (allocation)
Heaters 50
Thermostats 50
Temperature Transducer 30
Piping Assembly 50
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Table 3-4. Hi-Thrust Propulsion (Continued)
LRU Quantity
Cargo Module Resupply Subsystem
Press Resupply
Storage Spheres 2
Relief Valve and Burst Disk Assembly 2
Isolation Valve 2
Regulator 2
Press Transducer 2
Temperature Transducer 2
Disconnect and Umbilicals 2
Propellant Resupply
Prop Tanks 2
Isolation Valves 2
Relief/Burst Assembly 2
Press Transducer 2
Temperature Transducer 2
Disconnects and Umbilicals 2
Primary criteria used in the selection of Propulsion Subsystem LRUs were
component packaging, replacement frequency, and crew time and skill require-
ments. Also considered were the factors of parts commonality, DMS and instru-
mentation impacts, and LRU usage within the subsystem. Each subsystem
component was analyzed to determine first if replacement might be necessary and
second, if necessary, the optimum level of replacement in terms of minimizing
impacts upon both crew and equipment. In all cases, the LRU has been selected
so that a redundant capability exists to allow subsystem operation with an LRU
removed. Some performance degradation or partial loss of flexibility is, of
course, permitted in this situation.
Except where components are packaged together to minimize mechanical
joints and connections, most Propulsion Subsystem LRUs are individual com-
ponents. Another exception is the power distribution and control assembly.
Lower level replacement is anticipated for this LRU when more detailed design
information becomes available.
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Section 4
OCS CHECKOUT STRATEGIES
4.1 SUBSYSTEM CHECKOUT STRATEGY
Before further requirements analysis, it is necessary to develop a checkout
strategy for all Space Station subsystems to meet checkout objectives, which can
be summarized as follows:
* To increase crew and equipment safety by providing an immediate
indication of out-of-tolerance conditions
* To improve system availability and long-life subsystems assurancy
by expediting maintenance tasks and increasing the probability
that systems will function when needed
* To provide flexibility to accommodate changes and growth in both
hardware and software
* To minimize development and operational risks
Specific mission or vehicle-related objectives which can be imposed upon
subsystem level equipment and subsystem responsibilities include the following:
* OCS should be largely autonomous of ground control.
* Crew participation in routine checkout functions should be minimized.
* The design should be modular in both hardware and software to
accommodate growth and changes.
* OCS should be integrated with, or have design commonality with,
other onboard hardware or software.
* The OCS should use a standard hardware interface with equipment
under test to facilitate the transfer of data and to make the system
responsive to changes.
* Failures should be isolated to an LRU such that the faulty unit can be
quickly removed and replaced with an operational unit.
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e A Caution and Warning System should be provided to facilitate crew
warning and automatic "safing" where required.
* Provisions must be included to select and transmit any part or all of
the OCS test data points to the ground.
To attain these objectives via the use of an Onboard Checkout System which
is integrated with the Data Management System, checkout strategies have been
developed which are tailored to each Space Station subsystem.
Special emphasis has been applied to a strategy for checkout of redundant
elements peculiar to each subsystem. The degree to which each of these functions
is integrated into the DMS is also addressed.
4. 1. 1 SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEMS
Each major Space Station subsystem was examined with respect to the re-
quired checkout functions. The checkout functions associated with each subsystem
are identified and analyzed as to their impact on the onboard checkout task. The
functions considered are those necessary to verify operational status, detect and
isolate faults, and to verify proper operation following fault correction. Specific
functional requirements considered include stimulus generation, sensing, signal
conditioning, limit checking, trend analysis, and fault isolation.
4. 1. 1. 1 Propulsion Subsystem
The Propulsion Subsystem consists of two major elements, one being the
low thrust resistojet system and the other the high-thrust monopropellant Hydra-
zine System. Both systems interface with the GN&C Subsystem and the Data
Management Subsystem for control. In addition, the low-thrust system interfaces
with the EC/LS Subsystem for biowaste propellants.
4.1.1.1.1 Checkout Functions
Checkout functions associated with the Propulsion Subsystem include con-
tinuous monitoring of critical parameters, short interval limit and status checking,
and longer interval periodic in-depth testing to ascertain overall system health.
The continuously sampled parameters include storage tank, regulator outlet, and
manifold pressures, biowaste compressor pump speed, and heat exchanger temp-
erature. Other critical parameters, such as thruster head temperature and re-
sistojet heater power, also require high rate monitoring, but only at selected times,
i. e., during thruster operation. Less critical system parameters including valve
positions, propellant quantities, and secondary pressures and temperatures are
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checked on a low rate or as-required basis to verify system status. In-depth
testing is performed on a scheduled periodic basis or inconjunction with fault
isolation and includes functional tests of valves, regulators, pumps, and other
active components. Fault isolation is accomplished by combinatorial analysis of
operating conditions and by functional testing.
* Stimulus Generation - Functional testing and fault isolation of the Pro-
pulsion Subsystem utilize the normal operating controls, such as valve
actuation commands to establish the desired test conditions and to
initiate functions to be tested. No additional stimulus requirements
have been identified.
* Sensing - The sensing requirements associated with the Propulsion
Subsystem are contained in Appendix I of the Task 1 Final Report.
* Signal Conditioning - Signal conditioning is required for all sensor outputs
which do not fall within the standard measurement capability of the Re-
mote Data Acquisition Units. The exact quantity and type of conditioning
channels required are dependent upon sensor selection. Parameters
such as valve position and event measurements are normally imple-
mented as directly compatible bilevel voltages and require no special
conditioning.
* Limit Checking - There are two types of limit checking required by the
Propulsion Subsystem. The first is the continuous limit checking re-
quired in the case of critical but relatively static parameters, examples
of which are tank, regulator output and manifold pressures, and heat
exchanger temperatures. Out-of-limit conditions in these parameters
indicate the need for relatively expedient relief or corrective action
such as pressure venting which, depending upon the circumstances,
may be either manually or automatically initiated. A second class of
limit checking is associated with dynamic functions to which significant
limits apply only during certain operating conditions, such as during
thruster firing. Examples include thruster heat temperature and cham-
ber pressure. Detection of an out-of-limit condition in these cases
generally dictates termination of the operation or switching to an alter-
nate mode. It is apparent from the foregoing that the requirement
exists for selectively enabling and disabling the limit check on various
parameters.
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Trend Analysis - Trend analysis has potential benefit in predicting end
of life for wearout items in the system. The most promising application
is in association with the biowaste resistojet thrusters. These units
operate at very high temperatures using corrosive propellants, and
therefore must be replaced from time to time. Typical failure modes
include corrosion of the electrical heating elements and erosion or
blockage of the nozzles. Long-term analysis of thruster power con-
sumption, temperatures, and pressures are expected to yield inform-
ation indicative of such failures. Trend analysis of another form is
utilized to keep track of propellant and pressurant usage in both the
low-thrust and high-thrust systems as an aid to controlling resource
utilization and resupply operations.
4. 1.1.1.2 Redundant Element Checkout
Redundancy in the low-thrust system is provided by two parallel systems
from the EC/LS interface to the thrusters. These parallel systems each contain
the valving, compression pumps, regulators, and storage tanks necessary to
allow independent operation. Cross feeds and isolation valves are provided to
allow interconnection of the two systems at various points if desired. This design
also allows the two systems to be checked out and operated independently and al-
lows bypassing or isolation of defective components for purposes of repair or
replacement. The thrusters feature functional redundancy in that multiple thrust-
ers or thruster pairs are capable of supplying any desired moment to the vehicle.
These multiple units are also capable of independent checkout. Checkout of the
redundant elements is therefore readily accomplished and presents no unique
problems.
The high-thrust system also features redundancy in the form of multiple
storage tanks, pressure regulators, 'and thrusters. The storage tanks and thrust-
ers are isolatible by valving and may be exercised independently. The High
Pressure Nitrogen Regulation System contains parallel regulators, one primary
and one on standby, with automatic switchover via pressure switch interlock.
Switchover to the secondary regulator may also be initiated by command, thus
enabling checkout of the backup unit.
4.. 1. 1.13 Integration with Data Management System
The checkout interface between the Propulsion Subsystem and the DMS con-
sists of the measurement parameters listed in Appendix I. All measurements at
the interface are in the form of normalized 0-20 mVdc, 0-5 Vdc, or 0-28 Vdc.
No special test stimuli are required. Test sequencing and control as well as
operational control and display, are provided by the DMS.
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4.2 INTEGRATED CHECKOUT STRATEGY
This analysis identifies the integrated checkout functions associated with
Space Station subsystems during the manned orbital phase of the mission. These
functions are depicted in Figure 4-1 and are those required to ensure overall
availability of the Space Station. Characteristic of integrated testing is the fact
that the test involves subsystem interfaces, and, therefore, test objectives are
associated with more than one subsystem.
4.2. 1 INTEGRATED STRATEGY
Six checkout functions have been identified:
* Caution and warning
* Fault detection
* Trend analysis
* Operational status
* Periodic checkout
* Fault isolation
These functions represent a checkout strategy of continuous monitoring and
periodic testing with eventual fault isolation to a line replaceable unit (LRU).
Under this aspect the functions are grouped as -
CONTINUOUS MONITORING PERIODIC TESTING FAULT ISOLATION
* Caution and warning * Automatic tests · Localize to SS
· Fault detection · Operational * Isolate to RLU
* Trend analysis Verification
* Operational status
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General characteristics of these groups are defined below:
4.2.1.1 Continuous Monitoring
Continuous monitoring is not a test per se. It is a concept of continuously
sampling and evaluating key subsystem parameters for in/out-of-tolerance con-
ditions. This evaluation does not necessarily confirm that the subsystems have
failed or are operating properly. The evaluation is only indicative of the general
status of the subsystems. For example, a condition exists where the integrated sub-
systems are indicating in-limit conditions, but during the next series of attitude con-
trol commands, an error in Space Station position is sensed and displayed. Since
three subsystems, DMS, GN&C, and P/RCS, are involved in generating and
controlling the Space Station attitude, a "positional error" malfunction is not
directly related to a subsystem malfunction. The malfunction indication is only
indicative of an out-of-tolerance condition of an integrated function. Final resolu-
tion of the problem to a subsystem and eventually to LRU will require diagnostic
test-procedures that are separate from the continuous monitoring function.
There are situations in which the parameters being monitored are intended
to be directly indicative of the condition of a subsystem or an LRU. Examples of
these include tank pressures, bearing temperatures, and power source voltages.
However, even in these simpler cases when a malfunction is detected, an integrated
evaluation will be performed to ascertain that external control functions, transducers,
signal conditioning, and the DMS functions of data acquisition, transmission, and
computation are performing properly. This evaluation will result in either a sub-
stantiation of the malfunction or identification of a problem external to the param-
eter being monitored.
Figure 4-1 shows the logic associated with each function in the continuous
monitoring group, as well as the integrated relationships between these and the
total checkout functions. The caution/warning and fault detection functions are
alike in their automatic test and malfunction detection approaches, but are differ-
ent in terms of parameter criticality and malfunction reaction. The caution/warn-
ing function monitors parameters that are indicative of conditions critical to crew
or equipment safety. Parameters not meeting this criticality criteria are handled
as fault detection functions. Figure 4-1 shows that in the event of a critical mal-
function, automatic action is initiated to warn the crew and sequence the sub-
systems to a safe condition. Before this automatic action is taken, the subsystems
must be evaluated to ascertain that the failure indication is not a false alarm and
that the corrective action can be implemented. After the action is taken, the sub-
systems must be evaluated to determine that proper crew safety conditions exist.
Since automatic failure detection and switching can be integral to subsystem de-
sign (self-contained correction) and subsystems can be controlled by the operation-
al software or manual controls, it is imperative that the status of these events be
maintained and that the fault detection and correction software be interfaced with
the prime controlling software. For malfunctions that are not critical, the crew
is notified of their occurrence, but any subsequent action is initiated manually.
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The next continuous monitoring function, trend analysis, automatically ac-
quires data and analyzes the historical pattern to determine signal drift and the
need for unscheduled calibration. It also predicts faults and indicates the need
for diagnostic and fault isolation activities. An example of a parameter in this
category is the partial pressure of nitrogen. Nitrogen is used to establish the
proper total pressure of the Space Station. Since it is an inert gas, the only make-
up requirements are those demanded by leakage or airlock operation. The actual
nitrogen flow rate is measured, and calculations are performed which make
allowances for normal leakage and operational use. When these calculations
indicate a trend toward more than anticipated use, the crew is automatically
notified and testing is initiated to isolate the problem to the gas storage and
control equipment or to an excessive leak path. The historical data is not only
useful in predicting conditions but is also useful in providing trouble-shooting clues.
The data might reveal, for example, that the makeup rate increased significantly
after the use of an airlock. This could lead directly to verifying excessive seal
leakage.
The final continuous monitor function is in operational status. This function
is performed by the crew and is nonautomatic with the exception of the DMS com-
puter programs associated with normal Space Station operational control and
display functions. The concept of continuous monitoring recognized and takes
advantage of the crew's presence and judgment in evaluating Space Station per-
formance. In many instances the crew can discern between acceptable and un-
acceptable performance, and they can clearly recognize physically-damaged
equipment or abnormal conditions.
4. 2. 1. 2 Periodic Testing
As opposed to continuous monitoring, periodic testing is a detailed evalua-
tion of how well the Space Station subsystems are performing. Figure 4-1 shows
that periodic testing is not accomplished by any one technique. Rather, a com-
bination of operational and automatic test approaches is employed. The actual
operational use of equipment is often the best check of the performance of that
equipment. Operation of Space Station equipment and use of the normal operating
controls and displays will be used in detecting faults and degradation in the sub-
systems. This mode of testing is primarily limited to that equipment whose
performance characteristics are easily discernible, such as for motors, lighting
circuits, and alarm functions.
Automatic testing is performed in two basic modes:
* With the subsystems in an operating mode, the DMS executes a diagnos-
tic test procedure which verifies that integrated Space Station functions
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are being properly performed under normal interface conditions in
response to natural or designed stimulation. This mode of testing
allows the evaluation of Space Station performance without interrupting
mission operations.
* For those situations where the integrated performance or interface
compatibility between subsystems cannot be determined without known
references or control conditions, the DMS will execute a diagnostic
procedure in a test mode. In this mode, control, reference, or bias
signals will be switched in or superimposed on the subsystems to allow
an exact determination of their performance or localization of problem
between the interfaces. Since the test mode may temporarily inhibit
normal operations, the DMS must interleave the test and operational
software to maintain the Space Station in a known and safe configuration.
The scheduled automatic tests are performed to verify availability or proper
configuration of "on-line" subsystems, redundant equipment, and alternate modes.
* Periodic Verification of "On-Line" Subsystems - The first checkout
requirement is a periodic verification that on-line subsystems are
operating within acceptable performance margins. The acceptable
criteria for this evaluation is based on subsystem parameter limits and
characteristics exhibited during Space Station factory acceptance or
pre-flight testing. The rejection criteria and subsequent decision to
repair or reconfigure subsystems is based on the criticality of the
failure mode. If the subsystems appear to be operating properly, but
the test clearly indicates an out-of-tolerance condition, then one of the
following alternatives must be implemented:
- If the failure mode is critical, i the crew normally takes immediate
action to isolate and clear the problem.
- If the failure mode is not critical, the crew can take immediate
action, schedule the work at a later time, or wait until the condi-
tion degrades to an unacceptable level.
* Redundant Equipment Verification - A second checkout requirement is
verifying that standby, off-line, or redundant equipment and associated
control and switching mechanisms are operable. The acceptable/re-
jection criteria for these evaluations is identical to those for normally
operating equipment. A primary distinction of this function is that
equipment may have known failures from previous usage or tests. This
situation occurs when the crew has knowledge of a failure but has not
elected to perform the necessary corrective action; The checkout
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function then becomes one of equipment status accounting and main-
tenance/repair scheduling. The status information is interlocked with
mission procedures and software to preclude activation of failed units
while they are being repaired or until proper operation following repair
is verified.
* Alternate Mode Verification - The third checkout function is verifying the
availability of alternate modes of operation. This function is essentially
a confidence check of the compatibility of subsystems'interaction and
performance during and after a change in the operating mode. To some
extent this function overlaps with redundant equipment verification, but
is broader in scope in that it verifies other system-operating character-
istics. For example, some modes will involve manual override or
control of automatic functions or automatic power-down sequences.
4. 2. 1. 3 Fault Isolation
Fault isolation to an LRU is a Space Station goal. As shown in Figure 4-1,
fault isolation testing is initiated when malfunction indications cannot be directly
related to a failed LRU. The integrated test functions associated with fault isola-
tion are localizing a malfunction to a subsystem or to an explicit interface between
two subsystems and identifying the subroutine test necessary for LRU isolation.
In structuring this relationship between integrated subsystem tests for fault local-
ization and subroutine tests for fault isolation, the DMS, in conjunction with the
test procedure documentation, must establish an effective man-machine interface
so that in the event of an unsolved malfunction the crew will be able to help evalu-
ate the condition and determine other test sequences necessary to isolate the
problem. To accomplish this requirement, the DMS must be capable of displaying
test parameters and instructions in engineering units and language and be capable
of referencing these outputs to applicable documentation or programs that correl-
ate test results to corrective action required by the crew.
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Section 5
ONBOARD CHECKOUT TEST DEFINITIONS
5.1 SUBSYSTEM TEST DEFINITIONS
5.1.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The on-orbit tests required to insure the availability of the Space Station
subsystems are defined herein. Also delineated are the measurement and
stimulus parameters required to perform these tests. Two discrete levels of
testing are defined, i. e., continuous status monitoring tests for fault detection of
critical and noncritical parameters, and subsystem fault isolation tests for
localization of faults to a specific Line Replaceable Unit. In addition to these two
levels, tests are defined for periodic checkout and calibration of certain units,
and parameters requiring analysis of trends are defined.
Due to the software module approach to DMS checkout, it was deemed
necessary to estimate the CPU time and memory required to implement these
modules along with an assessment of the services required from an Executive
Software System to control the checkout.
These test descriptions, measurement, and stimulus information provided
for each subsystem, and the software sizing information provided for the Data
Management System provide the data required to estimate the checkout impact
on the DMS software and hardware. Table 5-1 is a summary of the measurement
and stimulus requirements for the Space Station.
The Propulsion Subsystem consists of two major elements, one being the
High-Thrust Monopropellant Hydrazine System and the other the Low-Thrust
Resistojet Thruster System. Both systems interface with the GN&C and Data
Management Subsystems for control. The Low-Thrust System also interfaces
with the EC/LS Subsystem for biowaste propellants.
5. 1. 1. 1 High-Thrust Propulsion Subsystem
The High-Thrust Propulsion System must satisfy both an initial Space
Station two-year artificial-gravity phase and subsequent zero-gravity phase.
The quantity of subsystem measurements and stimuli required for the former are
more than double the quantity required for the latter. This is due to increased
propellant and pressurant tankage requirements as well as the increased number
of thrusters necessary during artificial gravity operations.
Operation of the High-Thrust System is automatic with the thruster firing
controlled by the GN&C Subsystem. All other normal operational controls for
the subsystem are associated with tank switching, thermal control, and safing
functions. The need for tank switching is monitored and controlled by the DMS,
while the thermal control assemblies are controlled by various thermostats.
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Although the High-Thrust System is normally required only during scheduled
events such as the artificial-gravity experiment or docking, the system is continu-
ously maintained in a pressurized and ready-to-fire state. This concept is strongly
influenced by fluid characteristics, resupplying penalties, and the need for the
subsystem to be available for unscheduled events or emergencies. Safety param-
eters as well as certain other system status and readiness indicators are therefore
monitored continuously even though the system may be inactive. Scheduled high-
thrust events are typically at three-month intervals and are critical in nature. A
complete functional check of the system is therefore required prior to each event.
Resupply operations are also scheduled every three months and require that leak
and functional checks of the transfer system lines and controls be performed.
During the events and particularly during actual thruster firing intervals,
subsystem status monitoring requirements become extremely important. Appendix
I-2 of the Task 1 Final Report contains the measurements and stimuli required for
checkout of the High-Thrust Propulsion Subsystem.
5.1. 1.2 Low-Thrust Propulsion System
The Low-Thrust Propulsion System uses EC/LS-produced biowaste gases
(CO2 , H2 0, CH4 ) and stored water as propellant for resistojet thrusters. These
thrusters have a thrust level of 25 millipounds, and are used in a high duty cycle
mode (25-80 percent) to provide station orbit maintenance and, if desired, CMG
desaturation. The system consists of compression pumps, heat exchangers,
accumulators, supplementary propellant tankage, thrusters, and the necessary
valves, switches, etc., for system control, checkout, etc.
Normal system operation is in the orbit-keeping and attitude control mode
and is fully automatic. Thruster selection and control is derived by the DMS
computational equipment on the basis of inputs from the GN&C Subsystem. The
DMS also controls the subsystem configuration parameters such as propellant and
pressurant selection. These parameters are primarily a function of impulse re-
quirements and available stores. Manual control capability is provided to allow
crew override if required due to a malfunction or other reasons. On-orbit check-
out of the low-thrust system includes a combination of continuous monitoring,
daily operational status checks and trend analysis, a detailed periodic checkout
every three months, and fault isolation activities. Appendix I-3 of the Task 1
Final Report contains the measurements and stimuli required to check out the
Low-Thrust Propulsion System.
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5.1.2 STATUS MONITORING
5. 1. 2.1 High-Thrust Propulsion Subsystem
Continuous monitoring of high-thrust propulsion system parameters is
performed to detect over-pressure conditions, out-of-tolerance regulation, major
leakage, empty tankage, and thruster malfunctions:
* Overpressure - Each tank is relieved automatically through a burst
disk and mechanical relief valve when a major overpressure condition
arises. Tank pressure as well as relief valve actuation is monitored
continuously with a signal initiated to alert the crew of any unwarranted
pressure build-up.
* Out-of-Tolerance Regulation - Redundant pressure regulation is pro-
vided by parallel regulators, and automatic malfunction detection
and switching is provided by pressure switches which activate the
valves to each regulator. Pressure switches initiate the appropriate
commands dependent on the malfunction mode (high or low regulation
outlet pressure). A signal is also provided to alert the crew to any
regulator switchover.
* Major Leakage - Pressure transducer signals are monitored
continuously, and pressure decay rates are computed. An indication
of any abnormal pressure decay requires the initiation of closing the
appropriate isolation valves.
* Tank Switching/Isolation - Any pressure differential across the
propellant tanks (gas ullage to fluid side) is detected and the
appropriate switching commands initiated. This differential pressure
occurs when a tank runs dry thus requiring the next tank (normally
isolated) to be put on-line to feed propellant to the thrusters.
* Thruster Out-of-Limit Operating Pressure, Temperature, and Voltage
Conditions - The thruster, to operate safely, must have specific inlet
conditions. These conditions are monitored and thruster operations
inhibited if they are out of limits.
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5.1. 2.2 Low-Thrust Propulsion Subsystem
Continuous monitoring of low thrust system parameters is conducted to
detect faults and to initiate switching to redundant LRUs when necessary. This is
accomplished by a combination of integral sensing/switching provisions and DMS
action. The integral implementation is utilized primarily in the case of failures
which demand immediate and direct action to relieve a potentially hazardous con-
dition. An example is excessive pressure on the outlet side of a pressure
regulator. The condition would be detected by a pressure sensitive switch which,
when activated, would automatically operate solenoid valves to isolate the regu-
lator and switch to a parallel redundant unit. Notification of the occurrence
would be given the DMS which would then proceed to notify the crew and accom-
plish other required reactions, such as fault verification, repair direction, or
modification of Space Station operations. Faults which are less critical in nature
and those for which diagnosis and corrective action require the computational and
analytical capability of the DMS are processed by automated DMS routines. Table
5-2 lists a number of representative failure modes and the associated subsystem
or DMS action.
5.1.3 TREND ANALYSIS
Trend analysis is utilized for functions which are subject to performance
degradation of known and measurable characteristics. By observing the change
in the major performance parameters, component replacement can be scheduled
at a convenient time for the crew. Hazardous conditions can be avoided by trend
analysis prediction of out-of-tolerance conditions. Trend analysis is also used to
monitor expendable use rates. This pin-points locations of excessive expendables
use rates indicative of possible leakage or other failures, and also provides a
basis for resources management and resupply planning activities.
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Table 5-2. Representative Failure Modes and Associated Subsystem or DMS
Action
COMPONENT FAULT ACTION
Excessively high or
low pump speed
Out-of-limit inter-
stage temperature
DMS turn off pump and
isolate by closing appropriate
valves.
Same as above, initiated by
measurement in EC/LS
Subsystem.
Storage bottle and/or
High Pressure Manifold
Regulator
Excessive pressure
Out-of-tolerance
regulation
Flow Control Valve Fail close or open
Relief assembly vents gas(es).
Integral control.
Switch to alternate regulator
and isolate by closing appro-
priate valves. Integral control.
DMS switch to alternate feed
system and isloate by closing
crossfeed valves.
Heating element over
temperature
Out-of-tolerance
power consumption
Inlet valve will not
close
Leakage
Integral thruster cutoff.
DMS switch to alternate
thrusters.
DMS switch to alternate
thruster and isolate module.
DMS or crew inspection de-
termine source and isolate.
Switch to alternate assembly.
H2 0 Vaporizer
H2 0 Storage
Out-of-tolerance
heat input
Out-of-tolerance
pressure
DMS switch to alternate vapor-
izer. Turn off heaters and
close isolation valves.
DMS-switch to alternate tank
and isolate.
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Pump
Pump
Thruster
Thruster
Thruster
Fittings
5. 1.4 PERIODIC CHECKOUT AND CALIBRATION
5. 1. 4. 1 High Thrust
Daily checks of the High -Thrust System are conducted to determine its
operational status. A more detailed verification is also performed approximately
every three months.
Typical daily subsystem status checks are accomplished through visual
monitoring of displays and through automatic limit checks and trend analysis.
The following status checks are required:
* Subsystem Status - Insures that the subsystem is in an operational
state (satisfactory pressures, temperatures, valve positions,
propellant, and pressurant quantities, etc. ).
* Primary or Backup Assembly Status - Provides an indication of
whether the redundant or primary subsystem assemblies are in use.
* Tank Pressures and Temperatures - Verifies that normal operating
conditions exist and whether pressure and temperature variation
trends are normal.
The more detailed periodic checkout is scheduled over three-month intervals
and prior to initiation of a critical operation such as an artificial experiment.
In cases where a fault is detected, the applicable portions of the periodic
checkout procedure will be needed to determine the maintenance required. The
periodic checkout includes:
* Leak and Functional Tests - These verify the basic subsystem integrity.
Leak tests are performed both manually and automatically. The manual
checks are required to detect low-rate leak conditions which may be
detrimental over a long period of time if uncorrected. The functional
tests check both the electrical circuits and component (valves, etc. )
operations.
* Pressure Regulation and Thruster Performance Checks - The thruster
performance checks require monitoring and recording of chamber
pressure and temperature versus time during the firing interval.
Automatic/programmed test-sequencing and high-speed data sampling
at a rate of 250 samples/second are necessary.
5-7
* Instrumentation Calibration - One or two-point calibration is required
for both temperature and pressure transducers. Use of standard gages
or known pressure and temperature references is required.
* GN&C/Propulsion Subsystem Interface Checks - Simulated programmed
control commands are needed to verify the GN&C propulsion interfaces.
Other subsystem (DMS and Electrical Power) interface integrity checks
are also performed as part of the periodic functional tests.
* Propellant Sampling - The quality of the propellant must be determined
through taking a sample and returning it on the ALS for analysis on the
ground.
* Subsystem Hardware Life History Log - Automatic storage and display
of data is desirable.
In general, the test sequence for the detailed periodic checkout should first
include an evaluation of general subsystem status and safety critical parameters
followed by LRU-level checkout. The general test sequence should be to test the
high pressure storage assemblies first and then the subsequent downstream
assemblies. A total candidate sequence follows:
(a) Subsystem Status Check
* Pressure
* Temperature
* Valve Position
* Propellant Quantity
* Identification of On-Line Equipment
(b) Pressure Transducer Calibration Check
(c) Verify Purge (Checkout) Assembly Operational Status
* Functional
* Pressure (Regulation)
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(d) Subsystem Gross Leakage Test
* Pressure Trend/Analysis
(e) Verify Safety Critical Caution and Warning Circuits (over pressure,
relief actuation, regulator switchover, etc. )
* Electrical Continuity/Response
(f) Bellows Leak Test
* Gas Analysis of Pressurant
(g) Pressure Control Assembly Check
· Backup Regulator Switchover Circuit
* Regulation
* Pressure Switch Setting
(h) High Pressure Isolation Valve Check
* Leakage - Pressure Trend Analysis
* Functional
(i) Test Low Pressure Manifold and Propellant Tank (Gas Side) Isolation
Valves
* Leakage - Pressure Trend Analysis
* Functional
(j) Test Propellant Isolation Valves (Tanks and Manifolds)
* Leakage - Pressure Trend Analysis
* Functional
(k) Check Tank Switching Circuit
* Functional
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(1) Thruster Modules
* Isolation Valves - Leaks and Functional
* Isolation Circuits
* Thruster Valves - Leakage
* Thruster - Functional and Performance Firing
(m) Miscellaneous
* Vent Valves - Leak and Functional
* Catalytic Nonpropulsive (propellant) Vent Device - Functional
* Temperature Sensors - Calibration
* Resupply Subassembly
(n) GN&C - Propulsion Integrated Subsystem Test
* Functional - Firing Commands
* Performance - Chamber Pressure and Temperature versus Time
Verification
5. 1. 4. 2 Periodic Checkout and Calibration - Low Thrust
As for the High-Thrust System, daily operational status checks are required
for the Low-Thrust System. These daily checks are basically the same as those
described in Subsection 5. 1. 4. 1.
A more detailed checkout of the Low-Thrust System is conducted every
three months. All redundant elements within the system are checked, including
a verification of the proper operation of all valves. The daily checks only verify
valve positions, not valve actuation. A possible test sequence to be used in the
periodic checkout is:
* Subsystem Status Check
- Pressure
- Temperature
- Valve Position
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- Propellant Quantity
- Identification of On-Line Equipment
- Pump Speed
- Vaporizer
* Pressure Transducer Calibration Check (only every 6 months)
* Subsystem Gross Leakage Test
- Pressure Trend Analysis
* Verify Safety Critical Caution Circuits (over pressure, relief
actuation, regulator switch-over, etc.)
- Electrical Continuity/Response
* Flow Control Check
- Backup Regulator Switchover Circuit
- Regulation
- Pressure Switch Setting
- Valves
* Thruster Modules
- Isolation Valves - leaks and functional
- Isolation Circuits
- Thruster Valves - leakage
- Thruster Heaters
* Interface Checks
- GN&C
- EC/LS
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5.1. 5 FAULT ISOLATION
5. 1. 5. 1 High-Thrust Propulsion Subsystem
Fault isolation checks within the High-Thrust Propulsion Subsystem consist
essentially of portions of the detailed periodic checkout sequence previously
described. An example of isolating a fault following the detection of a change in
the regulator isolation valve is depicted in Figure 5-2. The following steps are
required to isolate a fault in the pressure control assembly. The example is
considered to be one of the more complex fault isolation tests for the high thrust
system.
1. Verify subsystem operational status.
2. Calibrate hi pressure and pressurant manifold pressure transducers.
3. Verify purge (checkout) assembly is operational.
4. Close propellant tank pressurant isolation valves, low pressure manifold
isolation valves, and regulator isolation valves.
5. Verify regulation isolation valves are functional.
6. Vent low pressure manifold.
7. Open primary regulator isolation valves.
8. Monitor downstream regulation pressure - either a high or low regula-
tion pressure failure indication should occur. If the regulator proves
to be satisfactory, the pressure switches or switchover circuits are
malfunctioning.
9. Close regulator isolation valve and provide pressure switch test
pressures from the purge (checkout) assembly. Verify pressure-
switch actuation pressure valves. If the pressure switch performance
is satisfactory, the control logic circuits must be malfunctioning.
10. Conduct electrical switchout circuit repair and checks as required.
(Note: The Electrical LRUs have not been identified for the Propulsion
Subsystem. ).
11. Reset regulator switchover circuit and assure the pressure control
assembly is in an operational state.
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Figure 5-2. Fault Isolation Check Pressure Control Assembly
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5.1. 5. 2 Low-Thrust Propulsion Subsystem
Fault isolation within the Low-Thrust System typically involves an input/
output relationship such as regulator inlet versus outlet pressure, valve command
versus position, etc. A typical fault isolation flow is depicted in Figure 6-3 for
a CO2 tank isolation valve failure. The failure is detected as a result of monitoring
valve position, and the crew is notified of switchover to the redundant valve. For
this case, the failure is either the valve or in the DMS control logic or data ac-
quisition elements.
Figure 5-3. Low Thrust System CO2 Tank Isolation Valve Failure (Open)
The capability to substitute redundant elements provides a very useful fault
isolation tool for the Low-Thrust System. This may be used in the case of the
pressure regulator assemblies, compression pumps, and water vaporizers for
example, where solenoid-controlled isolation and cross feed valves allow rapid
switchover to the redundant elements.
5.2 INTEGRATED TEST DEFINITION
The task of ensuring overall Space Station availability is primarily dependent
upon the proper structuring of individual subsystem tests. The ability to test the
subsystems independent of other subsystems is directly related to the number and
types of interfaces. As shown in Figure 5-4, the DMS and Electrical Power Sub-
systems (EPS) interface with every other Space Station subsystem. In addition,
the EC/LS Subsystem provides cooling to most of the electronic packages.
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This situation demands that in constructing the test for a subsystem these inter-
faces be taken into account so that erroneous or ambiguous test results will not
be obtained. In other words, before detailed subsystem fault isolation tests are
initiated, a higher level of testing should be performed to verify that all interfaces
and Space Station conditions that influence the subsystem are proper. Properly
designed, these higher-level tests will (1) indicate what Space Station conditions
must be verified, maintained, or changed; (2) localize the malfunction to a single
subsystem; and (3) identify the subroutine test necessary for fault isolation.
Since the DMS interfaces with all of the Space Station subsystems and is
used as the OCS, it would appear that all of the tests would be integrated. How-
ever, this is not a proper interpretation. When the DMS is used to verify the
performance of another subsystem, it must first establish itself as a test standard
against which the subsystem parameters are compared. Subsequent to this veri-
fication, the test is dedicated'to the evaluation of the subsystem. This test would
be considered as an independent test since the objective of the test was to verify
the subsystem and not the DMS. For a test to be considered as an integrated test
it must meet one or more of the following conditions:
* Test objectives associated with more than one subsystem
* Test involves subsystem interfaces
* Test requires proper operation of other subsystems
In several cases, the DMS must simultaneously perform the dual role of
OCS and functional elements. As an example, the DMS has a functional interface
with the GN&C and Prop Subsystems for the computation of guidance equations and
the execution of commands to the control actuators. When this functional closed
loop is being tested, the DMS must, in addition to performing its normal functions,
execute the test routine. For this type of integrated test there must be an intrinsic
relationship between the operational and test software. This relationship must be
carefully considered in structuring the integrated tests since unstable or inter-
mittent performance may be detected only in the exact operating mode under
closed-loop conditions. The number of integrated tests is not extensive due to the
approach of minimizing the different types of interfaces between Space Station sub-
systems. For example, interfaces between the DMS and other subsystems are
largely standardized. As a result, relatively common tests can be designed for
verification of the multitude of DMS subsystem interfaces or for localization of a
fault to one side of a DMS subsystem interface. All special integrated tests that
have been identified are discussed in the following paragraphs. The GN&C/DMS/
PROP configuration for navigation and attitude control poses the most difficult
problem for on-orbit testing so it is presented in significant detail. Other inte-
grated tests are summarized.
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5.2.1 GN&C/DMS/PROP
5.2.1.1 Block Diagram
Figure 5-5 shows the block diagram for the GN&C/DMS/PROP Subsystems
as configured for the zero g, horizontal mode of operation. The subsystems are
shown at the LRU level with all primary functional interfaces. For simplicity,
prime power inputs, cold plate interfaces, and mechanical or fluid connections
are not shown.
5. 2.1.2 Functional' Description
The GN&C Subsystem accommodates both the artificial-g and zero-g opera-
tions of the Space Station. In the zero-g mode of operation, the GN&C Subsystem
provides autonomous navigation, rendezvous command, traffic control, automatic
docking, and stabilization and control of the Space Station.
The autonomous navigation scheme utilizes the stellar inertial reference
data and the automatic landmark tracker augmented with the drag accelerometer.
The navigation is accomplished by automatically tracking known and unknown land-
marks several times each orbit. The landmark is similar in operation and mech-
anization to a gimballed star tracker. The drag accelerometer accounts for
anomalies due to Space Station orientation and docked module changes which
contribute to navigation errors.
Both ground tracking and onboard subsystems will provide the navigation
information for the first year or so of the Space Station Program. The ground-
generated data will be transmitted onboard for evaluation of the autonomous
navigation system performance. As the confidence in autonomous operation is
increased through this parallel operation, the ground tracking is to be phased out.
In all operating modes and orientations, the gyros provide the high-frequency
rate and attitude information necessary to supplement the data from the stellar
sensors and the horizon sensors.
A more accurate Earth-centered reference is obtained in the horizontal
orientation through the use of the strapdown star sensors. The star sensors pro-
vide the long-term, drift-free inertial reference data while the gyros provide the
short-term, high-frequency attitude and rate information. The passive star sen-
sors are used while the Space Station is maintained in an Earth-centered
orientation. The constant rotational rate required of the vehicle to maintain this
type of orientation provides the scanning motion for the star sensors, which are
completely passive and provide no tracking or scanning capability of their own.
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Figure 5-5. GN&C/DMS/PROP Configuration for Zero-G Horizontal Mode
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The sensors themselves provide inertial attitude data which is transformed into
Earth-centered attitude information by use of the navigation parameters. By this
method, both inertial attitude and Earth-centered attitude are derived from the
passive star sensors while the vehicle is in the horizontal or other Earth-centered
orientation. This Earth-centered orientation is considered to be most responsive
to experiment and subsystem requirements.
Primary attitude control actuation is provided by control moment gyros
(CMGs). A CMG configuration utilizing four double-gimballed CMGs, each having
a momentum capacity of 1,100 ft-lb-sec, was selected for the isotope/Brayton-
powered Space Station. Both High and Low-Thrust Propulsion Systems are
utilized by the GN&C Subsystem for CMG desaturation and backup attitude control
capability. The reaction jet control buffer provides the interface with the
Propulsion Subsystem.
The DMS provides the link between the sensors, which are used to determine
the vehicle angular position, and the actuators, which are used to maintain or
change the vehicle angular position. The use of the DMS provides the flexibility
required during both the development and operational phases to accommodate the
total Space Station Program objectives. The DMS performs the data processing
necessary for all guidance, navigation, and attitude control functions. The inter-
face electronics controls the flow of information from the sensors to the DMS and
converts all sensor inputs to a standardized format before the inputs are trans-
ferred. The interface electronics performs a similar function for output informa-
tion from the DMS to the control actuators.
5.2.1.3 Test Flow
The test flow for the GN&C/DMS/PROP configuration is shown in Figure
5-6. The flow demonstrates the technique for malfunction detection, subsystem
localization and fault isolation to the LRU. For simplicity some tests associated
with prime power, mode commands and cold plate temperatures are omitted. It
is assumed that in programming the actual tests these types of measurements will
be implemented as standard procedure. In the same vein, detailed tests of the
DMS are not shown. Again, it is assumed that the final procedure would contain
the necessary self-test, command verification, and other checks to maintain
confidence in DMS performance throughout the test.
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Figure 5-6. GN&C/DMS/PROP Integrated Test Flow (Sheet 1 of 4)
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Figure 5-6. GN&C/DMS/PROP Integrated Test Flow (Sheet 2 of 4)
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Figure 5-6. GN&C/DMS/PROP Integrated Test Flow (Sheet 4 of 4)
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Many of these test sequences will be repeated for different channels of data
or for identical sets of equipment. The test flow does not show the repetition of
these tests but indicates the need for them. For example, there are four control
moment gyros (CMGs). The flow shows a typical test for one CMG. It should be
pointed out that although the detail test sequence will be identical for all CMGs,
the absolute value of the parameters such as torque commands, gimbal position,
gimbal, rates will be different for all CMGs. In some cases, the test flow ter-
minates in an instruction for the DMS to check data transfer. This instruction
is intended to include all operations necessary to verify that the DMS is function-
ing as required to support the operational and test routine.
5.2.2 GN&C/DMS/COMM
The DMS has a functional interface with the GN&C and COMM Subsystems
for the pointing and control of antennas. The GN&C sends navigation and attitude
information to the DMS which in turn uses it to compute antenna pointing positions
and slewing rates. Once computed, the DMS transfers these commands to the
antenna actuators in the Communication Subsystem.
Localizing a malfunction to one of the three subsystems will be performed
in a manner similar to that described in subsection 5.2.1. The DMS will verify
receipt of proper attitude and navigation data from the GN&C Subsystem, check
its capability to operate on and transform the data into appropriate antenna
commands, and verify the transmission of the control data to the Communication
Subsystem. Verification of proper response and operation of Communication Sub-
system equipment will be aided by the switching and use of redundant transmitters
and receivers.
5.2.3 GN&C - PROPULSION SUBSYSTEM INTERFACE
The Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GN&C) Subsystem operates in a
closed-loop mode with the DMS and Propulsion Subsystem as elements of the loop.
Electrical signals to activate appropriate Propulsion Subsystem high thrusters
are provided by the GN&C jet drivers based upon control information computed
by the DMS. Although the interface between the DMS and the GN&C is fairly
complex, the GN&C - Propulsion Subsystem interface is not, and can easily be
incorporated into tests defined for the Propulsion Subsystem.
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Section 6
SOFTWARE
6.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The recommended software checkout startegy involves a sequence of
detecting faults, isolating faults to a failing LRU or LRUs, and reconfiguring the
system to continue operation while the failures are being repaired.
This recommendation was developed by evaluating each subsystem with
respect to the three general requirements of fault detection, fault isolation, and
reconfiguration.
Fault detection incorporates both the recognition of failure occurrence, and
the prediction of when a failure can be expected to occur. The Remote Data
Acquisition Units (RDAUs) continually check selected test point measurements
against upper and lower limits, and notify the executive on an exception basis when
a limit is exceeded. This approach avoids occupying the central multi-processor
with the low-information task of verifying that measurements are within limits.
Trend analysis is a fault detection technique recommended for predicting the
time frame during which a failure can be anticipated. Data is acquired on a basis
of time or utilization, and compared with previous history to determine if a "trend"
toward degraded performance or impending failure can be detected.
Another checkout requirement evaluated for each subsystem is periodic
testing. This type of test is provided to exercise specific components at extended
time intervals or prior to specific events, to assure operational integrity. In the
event that a failure is detected, the periodic test will isolate to the failing Line
Replaceable Unit (LRU) and accomplish recertification after a repair operation.
Calibration of specific subsystem components will be required periodically,
or subsequent to a repair and/or replace operation. The techniques involved are
unique to the individual component; and, in some cases, require the acquisition of
operational data.
Fault isolation is required when a fault is detected. When a particular fault
provides an indication that a life critical failure has occurred, the fault isolation
routines are automatically initiated. If the failure does not represent an immediate
danger to the vehicle occupants, the crew is notified and they will initiate the fault
isolation modules at their convenience.
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The basic requirements of the fault isolation function is to analyze the avail-
able information relevant to a problem, and identify the LRU which is responsible
for the anomaly.
Three basic approaches to meeting this requirement were considered. These
are:
* Analyze each fault as an independent problem
* Analyze each fault with a state matrix which defines the possible error
states of the subsystem
* Associate each fault with a specific subsystem, and evaluate that
subsystem in detail
The third approach was selected on a basis of software commonality and cost
effectiveness. The complexity associated with the testing can be reduced by locali-
zation of the logic associated with the analysis of the subsystem in a unique package.
The software commonality will result in reduced software development and main-
tenance costs, while increasing the reliability of the software.
The fault isolation software is structured modularly for compatibility with
the hardware structure of the subsystem. Checkout modules evaluate the per-
formance of a specific portion of the subsystem. A convenient division for this
modular structure is at the assembly level or functional area. A program module
which can determine and control the sequence in which these checkout modules are
executed is also required for each subsystem.
Subsequent to fault detection, the software associated with the subsystem
which is most likely to contain the error will be activated.
The subsystem software will analyze the error indication, and initiate a
sequence of checkout modules to isolate the problem. If successful, the crew is
notified regarding the Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) to be replaced. If an error
cannot be identified, the crew is informed of the situation and has an option to
execute the periodic test of the subsystem.
After a fault has been isolated, reconfiguration software restores the
functional capability of the subsystem. This is most commonly accomplished by
exchanging a redundant element for the failing unit, or by defining an alternate
path to accomplish the required function.
The Task 2 Final Report of the basic onboard checkout techniques study
provides descriptions of the software requirements, definitions and design in
addition to detailed flow charts of specific checkout routines.
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6.2. SPACE STATION SUBSYSTEM
The propulsion subsystem consists of high thrust and low thrust propellant
systems. Both systems interface with the GN&C subsystem through the Data
Management subsystem for operational control. The low thrust system also inter-
faces with the EC/LS subsystem for gases and water which are used as propellants.
The fault detection function required for the propulsion subsystem is accom-
plished by tables containing the parameters which must be monitored to assure
subsystem performance. These tables are transferred to the Remote Data Acqui-
sition Unit (RDAU) via the executive program. Exception monitoring is then accom-
plished. Figure 6-1 provides agraphic description of this function. Table 6-1 has
been provided to indicate the extent of the overall fault detection requirements.
The program described by this document is required for periodic. checkout
and fault isolation.
Initiation of the periodic checkout function is accomplished as the result of a
keyboard entry by a crew member. It is anticipated that periodic checkout will be
accomplished both daily and on a tri-monthly basis with somewhat different re-
quirements.
The fault isolation function utilizes the same software modules as the periodic
checkout; however, analysis of the detected error by the sequence logic module
permits selection of the appropriate module to begin the required fault isolation.
If the error is not detected in the selected area, the program module provides this
information and recommends that the periodic test be executed.
Subsystem calibration is performed in conjunction with the periodic test.
Trend analysis is executed on a basis of varying requirements by the executive.
Tables 6-2 and 6-3 have been included to provide insight to the requirements in
this area.
This program meets the periodic testing and fault isolation requirements for
the Propulsion Subsystem.
Since the Propulsion Subsystem consists of two independent subsystems for
propulsion, the division between the high and low thrust system was used to pro-
vide definition of functional areas for the program.
Figure 6-2 provides a functional breakdown of this subsystem and indicates
the associated assemblies.
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Table 6-1. Propulsion Subsystem Fault Detection Summary
l SAMPLE
~RA TE ~ 1/SecASSEMBLY 
Low Thrust System
Collection/Storage Assembly 20
Water Supplement Assembly 4
Flow Control Assembly 12
Thrustor Assembly 104
Power Distribution & Control 64
High Thrust System
Pressure Storage Assembly 8
High Pressure Manifold 2
Pressure Control Assembly 2
Low Pressure Manifold 2
Propellant Storage Assembly 28
Propellant Manifold 3
Thrustor Module 32
Purge Assembly 6
Resupply Assembly * 2
High Pressure Assembly * 8
Low Pressure Assembly * 22
Misc TemnerntrlreR i 100
Total Per Second 419
Total Per Minute 25, 140
Total Per Hour 1, 508, 400
Total Per Day 36 201, 600
* Only during Resupply Operation
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Table 6-2. Propulsion Subsystem Trend Analysis Summary
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SAMPLE
ASSE, MBLy ~ FREQUENCY 1/Day
Low Thrust System
Collection Storage Assembly 16
High Thrust System
Pressure Storage Assembly 8
High Pressure Manifold 2
Low Pressure Manifold 2
Propellant Storage Assembly 42
Propellant Manifold 3
Thrustor Modules 56
Purge Assembly 4
Total Per Day 133
a
Table 6-3. Propulsion Subsystem Calibration Summary
CALIBRATION
ASSEMBLY -FREQUENCY 1/3 Mon 1/6 Mon
Low Thrust System
Collection Storage Assembly 24
Water Supplement Assembly 8
Flow Control Assembly 20
Thrustor Assembly 6
High Thrust System
Pressure Storage Assembly 8
High Pressure Manifold 2
Pressure Control Assembly 4
Low Pressure Manifold 2
Propellant Storage Assembly 42
Propellant Manifold 3
Thrustor Modules 92
Purge Assembly 4
Resupply Assembly 2
Misc Temperatures 100
TOTAL 159 158
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* Collection & Storage Assembly
* Water Supplement Assembly
* Flow Control Assembly
* Thrustor Assembly
* Power Dist. & Control Assembly
Figure 6-2.
a High Pressure Assembly
e Low Pressure Assembly
* Resupply Assembly
* High Pressure Manifold
* Purge Supply System
* Propellant Manifold
* Thrustor Modules
* Propellant Storage Assembly
* Low Pressure Manifold
* Pressure Control Assembly
* Pressure Storage Assembly
Propulsion Subsystem Block Diagram
PROPULSION
SUBSYSTEM
LOW THRUST
SYSTEM
HIGH THRUST
SYSTEM
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6.2..1 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
6. 2. 1.1 Subsystem Definition
This program specification is based upon the subsystem definition which is
available as a result of this study contract. Some test points in this subsystem
are defined at the assembly level; and consequently, every failure which is de-
tected cannot currently be identified with an LRU. Also, the correlation between
the assembly test points and the LRUs is not always apparent.
6. 2. 1. 2 Collection Storage Assembly
The algorithm required to compute gas level (mass) in the storage bottles,
based upon the temperature and pressure, has not been defined. A straight-
forward application of Boyle's and Charles' Laws is expected.
6. 2. 1. 3 Trend Analysis and Calibration Constants
The algorithms required for trend analysis and the calculation of calibration
constants have not been defined, and could significantly impact the sizing esti-
mates. A least-squares fit to a best straight line is recommended.
6.2. 1. 4 Miscellaneous Temperature
The placement of the 100 miscellaneous temperature sensors, which are
defined for the subsystem, has been assumed.
6. 2. 1. 5 Fault Detection
The operational program is responsible for maintaining the proper test points
in the RDAU memory. This selection is dependent upon whether the storage assem-
blies are being resupplied, or the subsystem is in a "ready to fire" status.
6.2.2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
This program specification defines specific operational requirements for
automated checkout of the Space Station Propulsion Subsystem. The sequence of
testing attempts to examine the least dependent functional groups first.
6. 2. 2. 1 Sequence Logic Module
This software module is used to select the appropriate sequence of program
modules to be executed in the event an error is detected in this subsystem. It also
provides the sequencing required for both the daily and tri-monthly periodic tests.
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This module provides the entry points for the periodic and fault isolation testing.
In the event that a fault is detected, the failing test point will also be identified to
this module. The only outputs from this module are the displays associated with
the progress of the testing.
This module determines whether fault isolation or periodic testing is to be
accomplished. In the event that fault isolation is required, the detected error is
isolated to an assembly. If the program is unable to isolate an error in the
selected and associated assemblies, a message is presented to the operator recom-
mending execution of the periodic test.
When an error is detected in the Collection/Storage Assembly, it is examined;
and if it was the bottle pressure or relief valve, the isolation valve is closed prior
to execution of the Collection/Storage Assembly checkout module. If the detected
error was the upstream pump flow, the C02/CH4 flow from the EC/LS Subsystem
is verified prior to execution of the Collection/Storage Assembly checkout module.
If this checkout module fails to isolate an error and the problem was detected
in the propellant control valves, the checkout module for the Power Distribution
and Control Assembly is executed.
When an error is detected in the Water Supplement Assembly, a check is
accomplished to determine if a bottle pressure problem exists. If so, the
Collection/Storage Checkout module is executed prior to the Water Supplement
Assembly Checkout module to assure the current C0 2 pressure level.
The detection of an error in the Flow Control Assembly associated with the
regulator requires identification of the C0 2 /CH 4 or H2 0 line. In this instance, the
Collection/Storage Assembly checkout module, or Water Supplement Assembly
checkout module, is executed to insure an adequate supply of propellant. The
Flow Control Assembly checkout module is then executed to isolate the problem.
The occurrence of a module manifold pressure problem in the Thruster
Assembly results in the execution of the Flow Control Assembly checkout module
prior to executing the Thrustor Assembly checkout module. This assures the
supply of propellants to the Thrustor Assembly. If the problem cannot be isolated,
and the detected error was associated with the thrustor control valve, a final check
is accomplished by executing the Power Distribution and Control Checkout module.
The occurrence of an error in the Power Distribution and Control Assembly
results in execution of the checkout module for this assembly.
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Errors detected in the majority of the high pressure system assemblies
result in execution of the associated checkout module. In the instance of failure
of the high pressure manifold, propellant manifold, and the propellant storage
assembly, the program must determine if the system is in the resupply or "ready
to fire" configuration in order to select the proper sequence of module execution.
6. 2. 2. 2 Collection/Storage Assembly Checkout Module
This assembly takes the bio-waste gases (CO2 and CH4) from the EC/LS
Subsystem and compression pumps them to the storage supply or to the flow
control assembly. The gases may be stored separately or mix values can be
used to combine them.
The inputs associated with this module are the test points on the assembly.
The outputs are the normal operational messages indicating out-of-tolerance
situations, and the progress of testing.
The program module which assesses the status of this assembly meets the
requirements for fault isolation, and both daily and tri-monthly periodic testing.
This module assumes that the supply of C0 2 and CH4 gases from the EC/LS Sub-
system has been verified prior to execution.
The general program flow checks the bottle, isolation valves, and propellant
control valves. The fault isolation module tests only the lines (CO2 and CH4 ) in
which an error was detected; but the periodic test checks all loops in both assem-
blies. The last components examined are the mix values. The periodic tests
include all fault isolation sequences, and additional tests in the area of valve
control, trend analysis, and calibration.
The daily periodic test computes the level of gas in both storage bottles
based upon temperature and pressure data. This information is then transferred
to the data base for operational purposes.
This routine also uses the average of upstream and downstream pump flow
rates for comparison with the average of the readings from the previous ten days.
If the delta between these afterages exceeds a predefined limit, the operator is
notified.
The tri-monthly periodic check exercises both the propellant control and
isolation valves. These valves are only exercised in the fault isolation and daily
periodic test when a positional error is detected.
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The tri-monthly logic computes calibration constants for the storage bottles,
high and low pressure manifold temperature, and high and low manifold pressure.
This data is also used to accomplish pump leak checks.
6. 2. 2. 3 Other Software Modules
The two foregoing modules should suffice as examples. A more complete
discussion is included in the Task 2 Final Report.
6.2.3 INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
This program must interface with the Master Executive, the OCS executive,
and the propulsion subsystem hardware. The propulsion subsystem must also
interface with the following subsystems:
* Environmental Control/Life Support
* Power
* Guidance, Navigation and Control
* Data Management
The following interface diagrams referenced are in Appendix F of the Task 2
Final Report.
The interface between the propulsion and other subsystems is depicted in
Figure 3-17 (Appendix F). Figure 3-18 (Appendix F) diagrams the assembly inter-
faces in the Low Thrust Subsystem. Figures 3-19 through 3-23 (Appendix F)
provide detailed information regarding the Low Thrust Assemblies.
Figure 3-24 (Appendix F) represents the interface between the assemblies in
the High Thrust propulsion system. Figures 3-25 and 3-35 (Appendix F) provide
detailed information regarding the high thrust assemblies.
The operator is required to communicate with the program to accomplish the
desired function. Specifically, the operator must initiate the program using the
EXECUTE system communications element. The program may be terminated prior
to completion by using the system communication function.
In addition, when errors are detected, the operator is provided with options
to control program execution sequence. These options are referred to as GO-NO
GO options and permit the operator to restart the LRU which failed, resume the
program execution, or to terminate program execution.
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Section 7
MAINTENANCE
There are two aspects of maintenance which entered into the basic study.
Basic maintenance concepts were provided as part of the baseline resulting from
the Phase B Space Station study; they are discussed in subsection 7. 1 below.
Additionally, one of the study tasks was aimed at implementation of an onboard
electronics maintenance capability. The results of that task are summarized
in subsection 7. 2.
7.1 BASELINE MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
Maintenance concepts defined for Space Station subsystems are intended to
facilitate their preservation or restoration to an operational state with a minimum
of time, skill, and resources within the planned environment.
7.1,1 GENERAL SPACE STATION MAINTENANCE POLICY
It is a Space Station objective that all elements be designed for a complete
replacement maintenance capability unless maintainability design significantly
decreases program or system reliability. This objective applies to all sub-
systems wherever it is reasonable to anticipate that an accident, wearout, or
other failure phenomenon will significantly degrade a required function. Estimates
of mean-time-between-failure, or accident/failure probability, are not accepted
as prima facie evidence to eliminate a particular requirement for maintenance.
Should the accident/failure probability be finite, the hardware is to be designed
for replacement if it is reasonable and practical to do so.
As a design objective, no routine or planned maintenance shall require use
of a pressure suit [either EVA or internal vehicular activity (IVA)] . Where
manual operations in a shirtsleeve environment are impractical, remote control
means of affecting such maintenance or repairs should be examined. However,
EVA (or pressure suit IVA) is allowable where no other solution is reasonable,
such as maintenance of external equipment.
Time dependency shall be eliminated as a factor of emergency action insofar
as it is reasonable and practical to do so. This includes all program aspects of
equipment, operations, and procedures which influence crew actions. When time
cannot be eliminated as a factor of emergency action, a crew convenience period
of 5 minutes is established as the minimum objective. The purpose of the con-
venience period is to provide sufficient time for deliberate, prudent, and unhurried
action.
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7.1.2 ONBOARD MAINTENANCE FACILITY CONCEPTS
In addition to OCS/DMS capabilities, other onboard maintenance support
facilities provided on the Space Station include:
* Special tools for mission-survival contingency repairs such as soldering,
metal cutting, and drilling, as determined from contingency maintenance
analyses, although repairs of this type are not considered routine main-
tenance methods.
* Protective clothing or protective work areas for planned hazardous
maintenance tasks (such as those involving fuels, etc.).
* Automated maintenance procedures and stock location data for both
scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and repair activities.
* Real-time ground communication of the detailed procedures, update
data, and procedures not carried onboard.
* Onboard cleanroom-type conditions by "glove box" facilities compatible
with the level at which this capability is found to be required.
* Maintenance support stockrooms or stowage facilities for spares
located in an area that provides for ease of inventory control and
ready accessibility to docking locations or transfer passages.
7.1.3 SUBSYSTEM MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS
Space Station subsystems utilize modular concepts in design and emplace-
ment of subsystem elements. Subsystem modularity enhances man's ability to
maintain, repair, and replace elements of subsystems in orbit. Providing an
effective onboard repair capability is essential in supporting the Space Station's
ten-year life span since complete reliance on redundancy to achieve the long life
is not feasible. The need for a repair capability, in turn, requires that a mal-
function be isolated to at least its in-place remove-and-replace level. The level
of fault isolation is keyed to the LRU, which is the smallest modular unit suitable
for replacement. The identification of subsystem LRUs is addressed as a
separate, but interdependent, part of the Onboard Checkout Study.
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Specific subsystem maintenance concepts, of course, depend upon examina-
tion of the subsystems. These concepts are discussed in subsequent subparagraphs.
General subsystem-related maintenance guidelines that have been established for
the Space Station are:
* It is an objective to design so that EVA is not required. However, EVA
may be used to accomplish maintenance/repair when no other solution
is reasonable.
* Subsystems will be repaired in an in-place configuration at a level that
is acceptable for safety and handling, and that can be fault-isolated and
reverified by the integrated OCS/DMS. This level of maintenance is
referred to as line maintenance and the module replaced to effect the
repair is the LRU.
* A limited bench-level fault isolation capability will be provided on the
Space Station, but is only intended for contingency (recovery of lost
essential functions beyond the planned spares level) or for development
purposes. Limited bench-level support is also provided in the form
of standard measurement capabilities which are used primarily to
reduce the amount of special test equipment required.
* Subsystem elements, wherever practical, will be replaced only at
failure or wearout. Limited-life items that fail with time in a manner
that can be defined by analysis and test will be allowed to operate until
they have reached a predetermined level of deteriorated performance
prior to replacement. Where subsystem downtimes for replacement or
repair exceed desirable downtimes, the subsystem will include backup
(redundant) operational capability to permit maintenance. Expendable
items (filters, etc. ) will be replaced on a preplanned, scheduled basis.
7.2 ONBOARD ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE (STUDY TASK 3)
The objective of this task was to generate recommendations of supporting
research and technology activities leading to implementation of a manned electron-
ics maintenance facility for the Space Station. Early in the task it became apparent
that attention could not be confined to a central maintenance facility; it was neces-
sary to refocus the task to address implementation of an on-board maintenance
capability encompassing in-place as well as centralized maintenance activities.
The critical questions are the following:
* What is the optimum allocation of onboard maintenance functions
between in-place and centralized maintenance facility locations?
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e What is the optimum level of onboard repair (i. e., to line-replaceable
unit, subassembly or module, piece part, or circuit element)?
7.2.1 MAINTENANCE CYCLE
In order to place the task in the proper context, a generalized Space Station
electronic maintenance cycle is depicted in Figure 7-1.
A convenient place to enter the cycle is with detection of a fault ("In-Place
Maintenance" block). The fault is isolated to a Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). The
affected subsystem is restored to full capability by replacing the failed LRU with an
operable one from spares storage.
The failed LRU is taken to a maintenance facility (assumed for the moment
to have a fixed location in the Space Station) where it is first classified.as repair-
able or non-repairable. Classifications will likely be predetermined, and a listing
should be retained in the Data Management Subsystem. If the LRU is non-repairable,
it is placed in segregated storage. If the LRU is repairable on board, the fault is
further isolated to the failed Shop Replaceable Assembly (SRA). The LRU is then
repaired by replacing the failed SRA with one from spares storage. The repaired
LRU is then calibrated (if necessary), and its operation verified before it is placed
in spares storage.
Logistics requirements (replacement LRUs and SRAs needed) are transmitted
to ground-based logistics support functions by RF communications and/or Space
Shuttle. Failed units are taken away from and replacement units are delivered to
the Space Station by the Space Shuttle.
7. 2.2 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The study confirmed and emphasized the necessity of onboard maintenance for
any manned mission of any complexity and duration measured in months (up to 10
years for Space Station). Formulation of recommendations for implementing such
a capability required consideration of other topics first, and achievement of
certain interim results. The principal conclusions of this study task are sum-
marized below. The analyses leading to them are explained in the Task 3 Final
Report.
* Prior studies and developments of in-space maintenance have empha-
sized justification of first-level (in-place) maintenance, fasteners, and
tools for space application and human factors criteria. Much less
attention has been devoted to test equipment, maintenance training, or
definition of shop level maintenance requirements.
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Figure 7-1. Space Station Maintenance Cycle
* The baseline subsystem descriptions, checkout requirements analysis,
and software requirements analysis indicate that approximately 60 per-
cent of all faults (over a long period) can be isolated to the failed LRU
automatically under software control, without crew intervention. In an
additional 27 percent of failure cases, fault isolation to one LRU can be
achieved by the crew using the onboard Data Management System as a
tool. In the remaining failure cases, additional fault isolation capabili-
ties are needed. This is a good result for a "first iteration" and can
probably be improved considerably with a modest effort to modify stim-
ulus and measurement provisions.
* Crew involvement in scheduled and unscheduled maintenance (including
participation in fault isolation) is estimated to average 7. 2 manhours per
week over the total mission time. This estimate is most sensitive to
equipment reliability and levels at which onboard repair is performed.
It is affected little by the efficiency of automated fault isolation under
control of the Data Management Subsystem (DMS).
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* The recommended approach to maintenance in the baseline Space Station
is in-place removal and replacement of LRUs, without attempts to repair
LRUs onboard, if the resupply interval is less than nine months. Onboard
spares should be LRUs.
* For long resupply intervals or non-resupplied missions (as in a manned
interplanetary mission), in-place maintenance should be by removal and
replacement of LRUs. Repair of LRUs should be by removal and replace-
ment of Shop Replaceable Assemblies (SRAs). Onboard spares should be
SRAs.
* The Earth-orbital Space Station should include provision for development
of onboard maintenance capability and techniques applicable to long dura-
tion non-resupplied missions and/or the larger, more complex Space
Base.
* The baseline subsystem descriptions are at such a level of detail that
precise specification of onboard tools and test equipment is neither
feasible nor desirable. Anticipated needs identified qualitatively in the
study are: (1) a portable test module to supplement software fault isola-
tion as well as to assist mechanical adjustments and calibrator, (2) hand
tools for removal and replacement of electronic assemblies, (3) devices
for transporting and positioning spare assemblies, and (4) a central
maintenance/repair bench.
* Several tasks have been identified and recommended for future perfor-
mance, as part of a system study/design program or as separate
supporting research and technology tasks. The principal ones deal with
(1) development of a portable test assembly, (2) development of a repair/
test bench with special provisions for small parts retention and for de-
bris collection, (3) design for accessibility of test points and subassem-
blies, and (4) devices for transporting equipment within the Space Station.
The foregoing conclusions apply to the Modular Space Station as well as the
33-foot diameter, four-deck configuration.
The results of the study rest upon several assumptions and estimates,
derived wherever possible from related experience. The results are not sensitive
to small variations of the assumed or estimated values, except for equipment fail-
ure rates, which are most influential. Furthermore, it has not been practicable to
pursue all trade analyses to include all relevant factors. Nevertheless, the study
has generated valid insights into Space Station onboard maintenance and useful
visibility of the path to implementation of that capability.
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